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14.1 Introduction
When banking systems are in distress, should they be rescued? If so, in
what form and on what terms should resources be transferred to banks? Is
it possible to derive lessons from relatively successful bank rescue eﬀorts of
the past that would be useful to Japanese and other would-be bank res-
cuers? These three questions motivate our attempt to come to grips with
the lessons that U.S. bank rescue eﬀorts during the Depression hold for
banking policy in Asia today. The key challenge in any bank rescue policy
is to design a balanced approach that accomplishes the main objectives of
bank rescues—salvaging local information capital about borrowers in the
long run and increasing credit ﬂows to worthwhile investments in the short
run—while minimizing the damage to market discipline and bank incen-
tives toward risk that comes with government bailouts.
14.1.1 Should Banks Be Helped?
To the ﬁrst question we posed—whether banks should be rescued—we
oﬀer a brief and informal reply. There is certainly a respectable argument
in favor of rescuing banking systems from insolvency. Bank ﬁnance is cru-
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Japanese banks.cial to the process of capital allocation, particularly for investment by
small and medium-sized ﬁrms for which there are no alternative sources of
funding. Smaller ﬁrms can be a key source of recovery from recession. That
is especially true under current circumstances in Japan, Korea, and else-
where in Asia. In Japan and Korea, the growth of small ﬁrms is needed as
part of long-run structural adjustment away from excessive reliance on
large-ﬁrm conglomerates. Part of that adjustment requires that the ﬁnan-
cial sector ﬁnance the growth of small ﬁrms. Thus, in Asia, there may be a
particularly strong argument in favor of preserving a viable banking sys-
tem that can act as a source of ﬁnance for smaller ﬁrms.
To a large extent the argument in favor of assisting banks relies on at-
tendant reforms in bank lending practices that will ensure that bank credit
is channeled to ﬁrms on the basis of the merit of their investments. Those
incentives are part and parcel of a proper regulatory structure that en-
courages market discipline, which rewards value creation and prudent risk
management by banks. Banks operating under skewed incentives will of-
ten make unwarranted, value-destroying loans to insiders or to politically
inﬂuential borrowers. For example, Krueger and Yoo (2001) show that in
Korea resources have been channeled in large part to value-destroying
large ﬁrms. Thus, bank recapitalization must be combined with eﬀective
reforms of lending practices.
To what extent can one argue that bank assistance is unnecessary in a
world of free foreign entry by banks? Foreign bank entry is a potential al-
ternative source of funds for small ﬁrms, and one that is less likely to be
diverted to value-destroying investments. And foreign entrants into dis-
tressed banking systems tend to enjoy a relatively low cost of capital, for
two reasons: First, they have not suﬀered capital-destroying loan losses,
and second, they are better able to raise new capital because the absence of
loan losses also means that markets will impose lower adverse-selection
(“lemons”) discounts on any new bank capital oﬀerings (Calomiris and
Wilson 2003).
While there is substantial evidence that foreign entry enhances the eﬃ-
ciency of banking systems (Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min 1998; Kane
1998), it takes time for foreign entrants to establish information about bor-
rowers and familiarity with local legal and institutional arrangements.
Calomiris and Carey (1994) found that foreign bank entrants into the
United States during the U.S. bank “capital crunch” of the 1980s tended to
lend disproportionately to lower-risk borrowers, tended to purchase rather
than originate loans, and tended to act as syndicate participants rather
than lead managers. Furthermore, despite their conservative loan pur-
chases and originations, foreign banks tended to suﬀer worse loan losses
than domestic U.S. banks in the early 1990s, which further suggests an in-
formation-cost disadvantage. Although relaxing barriers to foreign entry
is clearly a crucial part of resolving a credit crunch and reforming long-
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tute for domestic bank lending in the short run. Thus, it is still potentially
beneﬁcial to provide some assistance to the most capable existing domes-
tic banks.
There is, of course, another reason governments wish to protect banks—
call it the “dark side” of bank bailouts. Banks are repositories of economic
and political power—a source not only of funds but also of substantial dis-
cretionary power over the economy. In Asia, as elsewhere, banks have been
used as tools of economic planning and also as a primary means of chan-
neling favors to inﬂuential parties (so-called crony capitalism). The idea
that the banking system should be turned into an eﬃcient, competitive
mechanism for attracting and distributing funds may make for a good
speech, but it still cannot realistically be described as the sole or overriding
purpose of banking policy in most countries. Never mind that the banking
crises that gave rise to the losses that now plague virtually every economy
in East Asia were the direct result of the perverse incentives of government
protection (the so-called moral hazard problem); too many inﬂuential
people simply have too much at stake to allow banking to be reorganized
eﬃciently. Banks are able to channel such favors only if they themselves are
recipients of subsidies from the government; hence the need to preserve
banks’ (and their related ﬁrms’) exclusive rights, and the need to oﬀer
banks subsidized deposit insurance, subsidized purchases of bad loans, or
subsidized capital injections.
Crony capitalists will appeal for bank assistance on the basis of the cap-
ital-crunch motive, while in fact hoping to channel government assistance
for banks into their own coﬀers (indeed, there is much anecdotal evidence
that aid to Korean banks in 1997–1998 ended up being channeled to dis-
tressed chaebol). Thus, the central goal of bank bailout policy is to design
bank assistance to meet the legitimate goals of mitigating credit supply
contraction for value-creating bank-dependent borrowers, while minimiz-
ing the potential abuse of assistance.
In this paper, we take it for granted that domestic banking systems will
be helped, even if, from the narrow economic standpoint, the likely costs of
such assistance exceed the likely beneﬁts. To emphasize the importance of
combining aid with proper incentives for banks, however, it is worth paus-
ing a moment to consider how costly assistance to banks can be.
There have been over 100 cases of banking system crises worldwide over
the past two decades (where a crisis is deﬁned as losses to insolvent banks
that exceed 1 percent of gross domestic product [GDP]—see Beim and
Calomiris 2001, chapter 7). The direct costs of bank bailouts are often
above 20 percent of GDP and above 30 percent of GDP in the recent
Asian-crisis countries of Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia. Estimated reso-
lution costs in Japan are harder to estimate, but likely will exceed 20 per-
cent of GDP. While that cost represents a transfer of resources from tax-
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signiﬁcant social losses associated with such an enormous transfer. First,
the ﬁscal consequences of having to ﬁnance that transfer are disastrous,
and often result in substantial tax increases and severe currency deprecia-
tion, both of which are highly distortionary. Furthermore, there are addi-
tional economic costs from forgone output in the wake of the economic
collapse that accompanies ﬁnancial crises, and there are additional dead-
weight costs from continuing to support ineﬃcient, value-destroying ﬁrms
via the lifelines that distressed banks provide to distressed borrowers.
The magnitude of the transfers that accompany current-day bailouts is
staggering in comparison to historical experience. Waves of bank insol-
vency used to be far less frequent and far less costly to resolve. The cost of
bailing out all the insolvent U.S. banks during the Great Depression would
have been roughly 3 percent of GDP. From 1870 to 1913, there were seven
major episodes of banking-system insolvency worldwide (deﬁning major
episodes as producing negative bank net worth in excess of 1 percent of
GDP), and only two of those produced situations where the negative net
worth of insolvent banks exceeded 5 percent of GDP; in both of those
cases, bank losses did not exceed 10 percent of GDP (Calomiris 2001).
The implication is clear: safety nets themselves, through their eﬀects on
bank behavior, have been a signiﬁcant contributor to the cost of resolving
bank distress (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and
Huizinga 2000; Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001). And it is worth reiterat-
ing that one of the supposed beneﬁts of safety-net assistance—limiting the
reduction in bank credit supply in the wake of macroeconomic shocks—is
usually illusory: Financial crises produce the worst credit crunches because
“resurrection strategies” by banks magnify initial bank losses from macro-
economic shocks and ultimately reduce credit supply accordingly. Once
banking systems collapse under the weight of safety-net-induced risk tak-
ing, the ultimate credit crunch is deeper and lasts longer (Caprio and Klin-
gabiel 1996a,b; Cull, Senbet, and Sorge 2000; Honahan and Klingabiel
2000; Boyd et al. 2000).
14.1.2 Important Policy Choices
The costs of government assistance to banks depend on the way rescues
are managed. The central questions of policy relevance do not revolve
around whether to bail out banks, but rather around the choice of which
banks to rescue and the means for doing so. If a rescue is handled skillfully,
the cost can be much reduced.
First, bank rescues need not involve all banks. While new foreign en-
trants may not be a perfect substitute for existing domestic franchises from
the standpoint of allocating loans to small and medium-sized businesses,
that does not imply that all, or even most, domestic banks are worth sav-
ing. If government can ﬁnd a way to identify and target relatively solvent
banks with relatively high franchise values (a task made easier by the fact
378 Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. Masonthat relatively healthy banks also tend to be the ones with higher franchise
values), and if it is politically feasible to limit assistance to those banks,
then the costs of a partial bailout could be much less than that of a system-
wide bailout.
Second, to the extent that the rescue mechanism chosen to assist the des-
ignated banks can be designed to minimize moral hazard, the risk of con-
tinuing bank weakness (and future government expenses on bailouts) can
also be reduced substantially. For example, conditions that limit the ability
or incentive of banks to channel credit ineﬃciently or to take on high risk
after receiving infusions of government capital can make assistance much
more cost eﬀective.
The history of assistance to U.S. banks during the Great Depression il-
lustrates these themes well, and can provide useful lessons for Asia today.
Section 14.2 reviews the history of bank distress and assistance in the
United States during the 1930s and examines in detail the role of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation—how it targeted banks, the eﬀects of
its assistance, the cost of providing assistance, and the way that it tried to
align bank incentives to protect against abuse of government protection.
Section 14.3 contrasts that experience with the recent government loans
and preferred stock purchases for Japanese banks. Section 14.4 concludes
with some speciﬁc policy recommendations. We argue that combining sub-
sidized preferred stock purchases with mandatory matching contributions
of common stock, limits on bank dividend payments, and reforms of bank
capital regulation that credibly incorporate market discipline into the reg-
ulatory process would increase the beneﬁts and reduce the costs of govern-
ment support for banks.
14.2 U.S. Bank Distress during the Great Depression
The banking crisis in the United States during the Great Depression pro-
vides a useful historical example of how policymakers can balance the op-
posing needs of protecting banks and maintaining market discipline over
banks. The authorities managed to mitigate the loss of capital in the bank-
ing system and its eﬀects on credit supply, while retaining market forces
that continued to reward relatively prudent banks.
In this section, we begin with a review of the severity of the shocks banks
faced and the extent of bank distress. We show how market discipline
transformed the contraction in bank capital into a contraction in credit
supply. At the same time, there was an increase in the illiquidity of risky as-
sets as the result of protracted bank asset liquidation.
We then consider the response of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion (RFC) to banking-system distress. Speciﬁcally, we present evidence
on how the RFC combined assistance with conditions for receiving assis-
tance in a way that preserved market discipline and protected the govern-
ment from excessive exposure to loss.
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Measured by bank failure rates, depositor loss rates, or the extent of bank
credit contraction, the Great Depression was, and remains, the largest and
most persistent shock suﬀered by the U.S. banking system since (at least)
the 1830s. Figure 14.1 presents data on the number of bank suspensions,
monthly, from 1921 to 1936, and ﬁgure 14.2 reports corresponding data on
the deposits of suspended banks. As these ﬁgures show, banking collapse
during the Great Depression was not a single event, but rather several waves
of bank distress. As Wicker (1996) and Calomiris and Mason (2003b) show,
these waves of bank failures reﬂected fundamental shocks that were often
region and bank speciﬁc—reﬂecting region-speciﬁc shocks to income and
bank-speciﬁc investment and risk management choices. Contrary to the
view espoused by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), which saw the waves of
bank failures as the result of autonomous waves of panic in the ﬁnancial
system unrelated to prior fundamental disturbances, Calomiris and Mason
ﬁnd that when one disaggregates by region and bank, it is possible to link
prior local and national shocks to subsequent bank failures. Calomiris and
Mason ﬁnd that autonomous sources of bank failure (resulting from either
“illiquidity crises” or failure “contagion”) were not important prior to Jan-
uary–March 1933 (at the trough of the Depression); thus, bank failures for
most of the Depression period (1929–1932) reﬂected a similar process to
that of bank failure during previous economic downturns.
As during previous periods of national depression or regional agricul-
tural distress (e.g., the 1890s and the 1920s), the United States suﬀered larger
numbers of bank failures than countries experiencing comparable shocks.
For example, Canada experienced few bank failures in the 1930s (Haubrich
1990). The primary reason that the United States suﬀered unusual rates of
bank failure in response to shocks was the peculiar U.S. “unit banking” sys-
tem—that is, regulatory limits on bank branching that limited bank oppor-
tunities to diversify their loan portfolios across locations (Calomiris 2000).
The consequences of bank distress for credit supply were large and pro-
tracted, lasting several years beyond the March 1933 trough of the De-
pression, as noted by Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983). Figures 14.3 and
14.4 show the synchronous contraction in bank capital and bank lending,
expressed either as aggregates or as ratios to total assets.
Table 14.1 measures the extent of depositor losses during the period
1921–1942. During the pre-Depression era, losses to depositors in failed
banks averaged roughly 5 percent. In contrast, losses suﬀered by deposi-
tors during the Depression were several times larger. Since the 1860s (the
period for which data are available), the ratio of negative net worth of
banks relative to GDP never exceeded one-tenth of 1 percent of GDP
(which it reached in 1893). The combination of the high failure rate and
high depositor loss rate during the Depression produced a loss rate on total







































































































































































































































































.deposits in excess of 2 percent in 1933, and a loss rate relative to GDP of
roughly 3 percent for the period 1929–1933 (measured as the ratio of total
depositor losses relative to average GDP, for the period 1930–1933).
14.2.2 The Role of Market Discipline in Limiting Bank Distress
Although these losses were large relative to previous U.S. experience, as
we noted above, they are quite small relative to the experiences of many
countries today, including many cases of countries experiencing much
milder shocks than the economic collapse of the Great Depression. The
low loss rates of historical banking systems, including that of the United
States in the 1930s, reﬂected the presence of market discipline. Calomiris
and Wilson (2003) show that depositors of banks (and to a lesser extent,
their minority stockholders) required banks to hold capital commensurate
with their portfolio risk, eﬀectively requiring banks to target low levels of
default risk. Banks that suﬀered losses on their investments were required
to ﬁnd ways either to curtail their asset risk (cut credit) or increase capital
(cut dividends) to restore their prior low risk of default. Those that failed
to do so suﬀered deposit withdrawals, as funds ﬂowed to lower-risk banks
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Fig. 14.3 Bank capital and bank lending, 1921–1937
Source: Mason (2001b).and postal savings. When losses on investments were suﬃciently sudden or
large, banks that failed to restore market conﬁdence were forced to close.
The existence of deposit market discipline does not imply that all or even
most depositors were capable of judging bank balance-sheet condition.
Rather, as Calomiris and Kahn (1991) suggest, discipline was concentrated
in the hands of a few depositors (often large depositors or interbank de-
positors) who had the wherewithal and the incentive to monitor bank
condition and react to deterioration in that condition. Passive depositors
could, of course, magnify the eﬀects of withdrawals from monitoring de-
positors by reacting with a lag to monitors’ withdrawals or other publicly
available signals of bank weakness (e.g., stock price declines, or newspaper
accounts of bank condition, which were widely available).
This process of market discipline is visible in a variety of facts about
bank failure and risk management. Table 14.2 reports the results of the
“basic” bank survival model from Calomiris and Mason (2003b). The co-
eﬃcients in table 14.2—derived from a model of bank survival during the
period 1930–1932—show the eﬀects of variation in bank or county char-
acteristics (which are observed periodically) on the predicted survival du-
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Fig. 14.4 Capital-to-asset and loan-to-asset ratios, all member banks, 1927–1939
call dates
Source: Mason (2001b).ration of banks. As table 14.2 shows, banks with lower net worth relative to
assets, or with higher portfolio risk, tended to be less likely to survive, ce-
teris paribus. Portfolio risk is measured here by bank size (smaller banks
tend to be less diversiﬁed), and by asset composition (riskier banks have
higher proportions of noncash assets, higher proportions of risky “ineligi-
ble” loans, and higher holdings of dispossessed real estate). Other variables
related to the location of the bank (including county unemployment or re-
liance on crop income) are also important determinants of bank distress.
Interestingly, table 14.2 shows that liability mix is also important for pre-
dicting bank survival, a result that echoes similar ﬁndings from many other
studies of U.S. bank failures in the 1920s and 1930s (Calomiris and Mason
1997). Calomiris and Mason (2003b) interpret the predictive power of lia-
bility mix as reﬂecting the fact that banks that relied heavily on interbank
deposits and bills payable for their funding had been rationed from the
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Table 14.1 Losses on Deposits in Suspended Banks, Annual, 1921–1942
Losses Relative to Deposits
Losses Borne Suspended All
No. of Deposits by Depositors Banks Commercial
Year Suspensions ($ thousands) ($ thousands) (%) Banks (%)
Pre-FDIC
1921 506 172,806 59,967 34.70 0.21
1922 366 91,182 38,223 41.92 0.13
1923 646 149,601 62,142 41.54 0.19
1924 775 210,150 79,381 37.77 0.23
1925 617 166,937 60,799 36.42 0.16
1926 975 260,153 83,066 31.93 0.21
1927 669 199,332 60,681 30.44 0.15
1928 498 142,386 43,813 30.77 0.10
1929 659 230,643 76,659 33.24 0.18
1930 1,350 837,096 237,359 28.36 0.57
1931 2,293 1,690,232 390,476 23.10 1.01
1932 1,453 706,187 168,302 23.83 0.57
1933 4,000a 3,596,708 540,396 15.02 2.15
Post-FDIC
1934 61 37,332 6,502 17.42 0.0228
1935 31 13,902 600 4.32 0.0018
1936 72 28,100 185 0.66 0.0005
1937 82 33,877 155 0.46 0.0004
1938 80 58,243 293 0.50 0.0008
1939 71 158,627 1,374 0.87 0.0033
1940 48 142,787 57 0.04 0.0001
1941 17 29,797 33 0.11 0.0001
1942 23 19,517 20 0.10 0.0000
Sources: Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 438) and authors’ calculations.
aIncludes banks suspended under Bank Holiday of March 1933.consumer deposit market because of their higher-than-average probability
of default.
Calomiris and Wilson (2003) model the “capital crunch” phenomenon—
the tendency of falling bank capital (due to loan losses) to produce declines
in subsequent bank loan supply—and connect that phenomenon to market
discipline by depositors. They argue that a bank credit crunch requires two
key assumptions: “risk-intolerant” deposits and adverse-selection costs of
raising new equity, both of which are the natural result of bank specializa-
tion in creating private information about borrowers. Depositor risk intol-
erance (a form of credit rationing in which depositors withdraw funds in re-
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Table 14.2 Survival Regression for Individual Fed Member Banks
Variable Regression Variable Regression
Constant 6.044
(0.283)
Log (total assets) 0.105
(0.011)
State-chartered bank indicator 0.136
(0.031)
Log (number of branches) –0.012
(0.006)
Deposit market share of bank 0.259
(0.099)
Noncash assets/Total assets –0.845
(0.124)
Loans/Other noncash assets –0.229
(0.058)
Loans eligible for discount/Loans 0.115
(0.054)
Losses on assets and trading/Assets 0.027
(0.049)
Real estate owned/Noncash assets –3.415
(0.331)




Share of demand deposit   Due –0.164
to banks (0.059)
Share of deposits due to banks –0.478
(0.203)
Share of assets due from banks 0.059
(0.060)
No. of observations (bank-months) 269,683
Log-likelihood –11,704
Source: Calomiris and Mason (2003b).
Notes: Dependent variable: log probability of survival (daily). Full sample of Fed member banks. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
Bills payable   Rediscounts/ –1.490
Deposits (0.146)
Private bills payable/Total bills  –0.126
payable (0.050)
Interest paid on debt/Debt –0.671
(0.428)
Crop Income/Crop   Manufacturing 0.317
income in county, 1930 (0.093)
Pasture share of farm acres in  0.063
county, 1930 (0.063)
Value of grains/Crop value in  –0.016
county, 1930 (0.058)
Unemployment in county, 1930 –1.204
(0.315)
Percentage of small farms in  –0.075
county, 1930 (0.052)
(Investment)   (crop income share)  0.139
in county, 1930 (0.036)
State bank share in county, 1930 –0.288
(0.047)
Lagged value building permits  0.054
in state (0.010)
Lagged liabilities of failed  –0.005
businesses/Income in state (0.004)
Growth of agriculture prices  –0.086
in nation (0.264)
Growth of liabilities of failed  –0.057
businesses in nation (0.054)
Time 0.044
(0.001)action to increased default risk) depends on asymmetric information about
the quality of the bank loan portfolio. Asymmetric information can moti-
vate deposit rationing for two reasons: agency costs, as in Calomiris and
Kahn (1991), or depositors’ preferences for claims that are easily accepted
in secondary markets, as in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). Adverse-
selection costs of raising equity are also a necessary ingredient to any
market-driven capital crunch; without adverse-selection costs of raising eq-
uity, banks would typically prefer to respond to capital losses with new
stock issues rather than with shrinking credit supply.
Tables 14.3 through 14.5 provide more direct evidence on the relation-
ships among bank capital, loan losses, depositor discipline, and credit con-
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Table 14.3 Financial Ratios and Default Risk for a Stable Sample of 
12 New York City Banks
Year MVE/BVE E/A % SA Bid-Ask % P SD P MVA
1920 1.23 16.73 2.33 2.53 0.00 0.0 306
1921 1.40 18.03 2.78 2.41 0.30 1.0 317
1922 1.51 18.40 4.27 2.09 7.75 26.5 363
1923 1.54 20.25 1.85 1.73 0.00 0.0 352
1924 1.89 21.70 3.72 1.78 0.00 0.0 434
1925 2.36 24.77 5.49 1.47 0.07 0.2 482
1926 2.27 26.10 2.88 1.26 0.00 0.0 530
1927 2.81 32.16 5.89 1.47 0.00 0.0 573
1928 3.82 34.16 8.28 2.58 0.08 0.2 858
1929 2.80 33.10 17.45 2.74 33.46 71.3 1,045
1930 2.06 26.86 8.32 2.05 1.24 2.8 998
1931 1.02 18.54 8.03 4.18 9.18 10.4 739
1932 1.16 19.24 10.62 5.64 34.73 46.8 712
1933 0.88 15.02 6.10 5.41 41.69 112.5 641
1934 0.98 13.88 3.75 5.48 11.72 40.5 781
1935 1.34 16.96 6.32 4.41 23.09 75.4 907
1936 1.32 16.74 4.31 3.66 1.32 4.5 976
1937 0.94 12.95 3.74 4.28 0.60 1.0 863
1938 0.91 12.05 3.49 5.49 7.08 19.5 923
1939 1.39 14.70 5.55 5.63 0.50 1.6 1,133
1940 0.93 9.55 2.01 6.71 2.14 7.4 1,260
Source: Calomiris and Wilson (2003).
Notes: The stable sample is deﬁned as the sample of banks that are present in the database
throughout the period. The sample of banks is restricted to banks with available stock prices,
as described in Calomiris and Wilson (2003, data appendix). Data are measured at year-end.
Variable deﬁnitions:
MVE   average market value of equity
BVE   average book value of equity
E/A   average market capital-to-asset ratio
SA   average asset volatility (standard deviation of asset returns)
Bid-Ask   average bid-ask spread as a percentage of share price
P   average deposit default premium in basis points (1.00   1 basis point)
SD P   standard deviation of P
MVA   average market value of assets ($ millions)traction from Calomiris and Wilson (2003), using a sample of publicly
traded New York City banks for the period 1920–1940. As table 14.3
shows, during the 1920s, as lending opportunities expanded and the econ-
omy remained relatively healthy, bank asset risk expanded alongside the
market capital ratio. The growth in asset risk and capital ratios reﬂected
substantial increases in banks’ loan-to-asset ratios, and frequent bank
stock oﬀerings. With the exception of the postrecession year (1922), banks
maintained constant and very low default risk during the 1920s, as mea-
sured by implied default premiums on bank debt (derived from equity re-
turns and balance sheet data, using the Black-Scholes model). In the wake
of the loan losses of 1929–1933, bank default risk rose substantially. In or-
der to reestablish low default risk in the face of declining capital, banks cut
loans and accumulated cash to keep asset risk from rising. They also cut
dividends to mitigate the decline in their capital ratios. As table 14.3 shows,
even as late as 1936 banks had not fully returned to their pre-1929 level of
default risk. The recession of 1937–1938 again produced loan losses and
further encouraged cuts in lending and dividends.
Table 14.4 reports the ﬁndings from an annual panel regression that ex-
amines the role of deposit rationing in encouraging banks to adopt this
strategy. The dependent variable is individual bank deposit growth. Table
14.4 shows that banks with high default premiums lost more deposits than
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Table 14.4 Deposit Growth Regressions
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 9.528* 10.234* 12.526* 14.192*
(1.038) (1.093) (2.415) (2.547)
P –0.0497* –0.1166* –0.0514* –0.1293*
(0.0136) (0.0289) (0.0137) (0.0301)
Trust Co. –4.476 –5.275
(2.809) (2.906)
Nat. Bank –2.181 –2.995
(2.998) (3.094)
Lagged Ind. Prod. –2.678 –6.689
(6.594) (6.915)
Adj. R2 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.028
Source: Calomiris and Wilson (2003).
Notes: Pis the (end-of-year) deposit default premium, derived from the Black-Scholes model,
using stock returns and balance-sheet data over the last six months of the year. Nat. Bank and
Trust Co. are indicator variables for national banks and state trust companies. In the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, P is treated as an endogenous variable, and the list of
instruments includes lagged values of the following variables: the market capital-to-asset ra-
tio, the implied standard deviation of returns to assets, and growth in industrial production.
Dependent variable is annual percentage change in deposits. Standard errors are in paren-
theses.
*Signiﬁcant at below the 5 percent level.other banks. Table 14.5 presents annual panel regressions showing how
banks cut dividends in response to capital scarcity. Banks with higher de-
fault risk tended to cut dividends more. Banks with higher bid-ask spreads
(where the bid-ask spread is expressed as a percentage of stock value) also
tended to cut dividends by more. Calomiris and Wilson (2003) use the bid-
ask spread as a proxy for high adverse-selection costs of raising capital.
They interpret the negative coeﬃcient on the bid-ask spread in table 14.5
as indicating a precautionary demand for preserving capital by banks that
knew they faced high costs of raising capital if they were forced to do so.
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Table 14.5 Dividend Growth Regressions (1929–1939)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 3.77 6.75 7.85
(4.13) (8.91) (9.21)
Ba –1.91* –1.78* –1.81*
(0.65) (0.67) (0.75)


























Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.05
Source: Calomiris and Wilson (2003).
Notes: The variables Ba and P are the end-of-year bid-ask spread and deposit default pre-
mium, respectively; 1939 is the omitted year dummy. Dependent variable is annual percent-
age change in dividends. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at below the 5 percent level.The evidence in tables 14.2 through 14.5 indicates that during the Great
Depression U.S. banks were subject to market discipline, which required
them to respond to loan losses with reduced lending and dividends (see
also Calomiris and Mason 2003a). Market discipline was able to operate
on banks in the 1930s because government assistance to banks was limited,
and thus insolvent banks were not protected from market discipline by the
various forms of government assistance that banks received. Assistance
during the 1930s included loans from the Fed, loans and preferred stock
purchases from the RFC, and federal deposit insurance on small deposits.
Deposit insurance was limited to small deposits (see Calomiris and White
1994), and banks that were insolvent in 1933 were not permitted to qualify
for deposit insurance in 1934. And, as we will discuss in detail below, loans
and preferred stock were supplied in a way that limited the potential abuse
of such assistance.
In today’s world of expanded safety nets and generous bailouts—as, for
example, in Japan—credit crunches can (and should) still occur, but typi-
cally depend on regulatory, rather than market, discipline to link bank
losses to contractions in risk. The creation of a bank safety net makes it nec-
essary to impose risk-based capital regulation to protect against abuse of
government protection. Risk-based capital regulation seeks to mimic mar-
ket discipline by measuring asset risk (e.g., loan default risk and interest
rate risk) and linking equity capital requirements to the level of bank risk.
Although this approach is generally not fully eﬀective, and has been the
subject of much critical examination (Calomiris 1997; Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee 2000; Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001), it can serve
to limit at least some means of bank risk-taking. For example, Baer and
McElravey (1993) examined U.S. bank asset growth in the 1980s (under the
new regime of capital regulation and enforcement that was enacted fol-
lowing the loan losses of the post-1986 period). They and others have
found that bank asset growth was closely related to the adequacy of regu-
latory capital. Banks with low capital tended to grow the slowest.
Asset or loan growth, however, do not measure overall bank risk. Oth-
ers have found substantial evidence that true default risk may be high even
when banks reduce their loans to comply with risk-based capital stan-
dards. Thus, unlike market discipline (which evaluates the overall riskiness
of the bank), regulatory discipline based on rules of thumb that measure
bank risk will tend to invite “risk arbitrage” by regulated banks (the search
for asset positions whose risks are underestimated by regulatory capital
standards). We return to this problem in our discussion of Japan in section
14.3, and in section 14.4’s discussion of policy options.
14.2.3 The Cumulative Eﬀects of Banking Distress 
on Illiquid Asset Markets
Although market discipline was present in the 1930s, and insolvent
banks were allowed to fail, the removal of bank assets from bankers’
390 Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. Masoncontrol did not imply the speedy resolution of borrowers’ distress. Non-
performing loans of insolvent banks were not liquidated quickly during the
Depression. As in many Asian countries today, as the stock of failed banks’
loans accumulated, the speed of loan resolution slowed. This loan resolu-
tion backlog eﬀect is analyzed by Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2003). They
ﬁnd that this measure of ﬁnancial-sector distress is a better forecaster of
economic activity, and a better explanatory variable for the persistence of
output decline during the Depression, than previously used measures of ﬁ-
nancial sector distress.
Figure 14.5 plots the cumulative “stock” of outstanding (unpaid) de-
posits in failed national banks over time, their measure of the stock of un-
resolved bank assets. The authors estimate this quantity using data on the
speed of liquidations by receivers and conservators of failed banks. Unin-
sured depositors were paid on a pro rata basis as the asset liquidation of
their failed banks proceeded. The average liquidation time for national
banks ran a little more than six years.
Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2003) cite numerous qualitative sources that
saw the slow pace of asset liquidation as a source of depositor illiquidity
and reduced consumption. Mason (2002) suggests that low liquidation
speed was the result of concerns about the real option forgone by selling
into a liquidity-depressed market. Observers saw the backlog of unsold as-
sets as depressing investment; the vast supply of property put up for sale
depressed property values—which contributed to the unprecedented
losses suﬀered by depositors—and produced a form of gridlock in local
markets. Buyers lacked liquidity and sellers trying to realize the full value
of assets were reluctant to sell at prices that were perceived as containing a
hefty illiquidity discount.
The important implication of this research is that systemwide bank fail-
ures pose special costs to society, not just because of the loss of lending ca-
pacity by banks that have lost capital, but additionally because of the eﬀects
of bank asset liquidation on consumer liquidity and the accentuated liquid-
ity premium in property markets. It follows that an additional beneﬁt of as-
sistance to banks, and countercyclical macroeconomic policy, during a de-
pression is their positive eﬀect on the liquidity of bank assets and liabilities.
14.2.4 The Policy Response to Financial-Sector 
Distress during the Depression
To  understand the way central bankers and government oﬃcials re-
sponded to the Depression one must be familiar with the histories of pre-
vious business cycles, which had produced certain policy rules, and with
the ways in which the shocks of the 1930s diﬀered from those of earlier
business cycles. Of central relevance was the fact that, prior to the inter-
warp eriod, the price process under the classical gold standard tended to
be mean-reverting. As Eichengreen (1992) and Temin (1989) have noted,
the establishment of the interwar gold exchange standard suﬀered from a 
























































































































































































































































































.long-run deﬂationary bias that was aggravated by the failure of coordina-
tion among central banks in response to shocks to global liquidity.
As more and more countries began to return to gold in the mid-1920s,
and as income growth further increased the demand for gold, international
imbalances produced contractionary monetary policy in some countries
(in keeping with the so-called rules of the game for central banks under the
gold standard), but that contraction was not oﬀset by appropriate expan-
sion in other countries. World War I had undermined the ability of the ma-
jor countries to coordinate policy in response to this global deﬂationary
shock. Instead of working together to expand the global supply of money,
central banks scrambled for gold and shrank the world money supply, thus
driving the price level down and producing a global debt deﬂation.
The Fed was a relatively new institution as of 1929. It developed an ap-
proach to countercyclical monetary policy during the 1920s that reacted to
interest rates, free reserves, and gold ﬂows. Those policy-reaction rules of
thumb worked reasonably well in the 1920s, but aggravated the contraction
in monetary policy in the 1930s (Wheelock 1991; Calomiris and Wheelock
1998). In that deﬂationary environment, contrary to the Fed’s interpreta-
tion, low nominal interest rates and high reserve holdings did not imply
loose monetary conditions.
The Fed’s role as a lender of last resort was ill-deﬁned. The Federal Re-
serve Act contemplated the role of the Fed as primarily inﬂuencing the sea-
sonal availability of reserves, not giving assistance to improve individual
banks’ chances of survival, and certainly not bailing out insolvent banks.
And because the previous macroeconomic environment had never wit-
nessed the like of the monetary policy–induced collapse of the 1930s, the
American experience with banking crises had never provided any motive
for interventionist policies to prop up banks. Banking panics in 1857, 1873,
1884, 1890, 1893, 1896, and 1907 were short-lived moments of confusion
about the incidence of loss, and resulted in few bank failures (Calomiris
and Gorton 1991). They were very mild aﬀairs compared to the bank fail-
ure waves of the 1930s. Moreover, bank failures in agricultural areas and
nationwide bank panics were understood to be closely linked to the frag-
mented unit banking system; rapid bank industry consolidation during the
1920s seemed to point toward a more stable future.
The bank failures of the 1920s were severe in some agricultural areas, but
were directly linked to the post–World War I collapse of prices. That, along
with the fact that agricultural states that had enacted deposit insurance in
the 1910s and 1920s experienced the worst bank failure waves in the 1920s,
led policymakers to view eﬀorts to prop up banks as counterproductive.
Deposit insurance had been a disastrous policy when tried at the state level,
and the experience was fresh in the minds of policymakers in the late 1920s.
The eight state deposit insurance systems lay in ruins at that time, and were
clearly and properly understood by observers (including President Roo-
How to Restructure Failed Banking Systems: United States and Japan 393sevelt, who opposed deposit insurance) as examples of what happens to
banking systems that relax the discipline of the marketplace (Calomiris
1989, 1990; Calomiris and White 1994).
The banking collapse of the 1930s, however, was simply too severe and
too widespread to be ignored, and politicians found in the severity of bank-
ing collapse new opportunities. For Congressman Henry Steagall, the De-
pression oﬀered the chance to pass a long-dormant proposal for federal
deposit insurance (which had been understood for ﬁfty years to be special-
interest legislation for small agricultural banks). For Senator Carter Glass,
the Depression provided the opportunity to push through his decades-long
quest to separate commercial banks from capital markets by fostering the
now-discredited view that the mixing of commercial and investment bank-
ing had caused banks to collapse during the Depression (White 1986;
Calomiris and White 1994).
Political opportunism was not the only reason for intervention in the
landmark Banking Act of 1933. Banks were collapsing as never before, and
even surviving banks were slashing credit. President Hoover’s initial reac-
tion to bank collapse in 1930–1932 was understandably reluctant and cau-
tious about federal assistance to distressed banks. By January 1933, how-
ever, the ﬁnancial system was in free-fall. February and March saw most
states declaring banking holidays to avoid the runs that were bringing so
many banks down so quickly. The Fed and the RFC, both of which had
been making collateralized loans to banks, were criticized for failing to
provide adequate assistance.
And so, in March 1933, there was a sudden shift: a national bank holi-
day was enacted, federal deposit insurance (for small deposit accounts)
was passed, and the RFC was authorized to purchase preferred stock in
banks and other enterprises. Suspended banks would be examined; those
that were solvent would be permitted to reopen and join the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Some would be nudged to solvency
by the RFC, if necessary. Deeply insolvent banks would be shut down.
Perhaps even more importantly, President Roosevelt took the country oﬀ
of the gold standard. Deﬂation, and deﬂationary expectations, came to a
halt. Industrial production immediately began to recover. That same pat-
tern of immediate recovery was enjoyed by other countries that abandoned
the gold standard in 1931, as Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) show.
14.2.5 The Operation of the RFC
Initially (from its founding in February 1932 until 21 July 1932) the RFC
operated under the same conservative lending rules as the Fed. After the
ouster of its chairman (who also served as chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board) in July, RFC collateral standards were relaxed. Lending to banks
and other ﬁrms grew thereafter. Beginning in March 1933, the RFC’s
preferred-stock purchase program dominated its assistance to banks, as
shown in table 14.6 and ﬁgures 14.6 and 14.7.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Part of the shift to preferred stock reﬂected the widespread view that se-
cured loans did not stabilize weak banks (James 1938, 1044). Secured loans
represented a senior claim on bank assets relative to deposits, and thus
eﬀectively worsened the default risk faced by junior depositors. Olson
(1977, 154) writes:
High collateral requirements forced [banks] to isolate their most liquid
assets as security for RFC loans. In April 1932, for example, the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation loaned the Reno National Bank over
$1,100,000, but in the process took as collateral over $3,000,000 of the
bank’s best securities. This in itself left the bank unable to meet any fu-
ture emergency demands for funds by depositors.
In Olson’s (1972, 177) view, loans from “the RFC helped only those basi-
cally sound enterprises which needed temporary liquidity.” It was not a
means of reducing default risk for a capital-impaired bank; thus, it pro-
vided little relief to banks from default-risk-intolerant market discipline.
Preferred stock, in contrast, was junior to bank deposits, and was not se-
cured by high-quality bank assets. Thus, it oﬀered a means of lowering de-
posit default risk and thus insulating risky banks from the threat of deposit
withdrawal. By March 1934 the RFC had purchased preferred stock in
nearly half the commercial banks in the United States. By June 1935, these
RFC investments made up more than one-third of the outstanding capital
of the banking system (Olson 1988, 82).
Mason (1996, 2001a) examines the relative eﬀectiveness of loans and
preferred stock purchases by the RFC, after controlling for diﬀerences in
the characteristics of banks receiving both kinds of assistance. As table
14.7 and ﬁgure 14.8 show, using a model of bank failure risk to compute
exogenous probabilities of default, Mason found little diﬀerence in the ex-
ogenous default risk of banks receiving loans versus those receiving pre-
ferred stock assistance. Table 14.8 examines the eﬀects of the two types of
assistance on the probability of bank failure, after controlling for diﬀer-
ences in exogenous characteristics using a Heckman correction. Accord-
ing to these results, receiving a loan from the RFC actually raised the prob-
ability of bank failure, while receiving preferred stock assistance reduced
the probability of failure.
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Table 14.7 Test of the Diﬀerence between the Mean Predicted Probability of Bank
Failure Based on Exogenous Characteristics: Banks Receiving RFC
Loans and Preferred Stock
Banks Receiving Banks Receiving T-Statistic for Diﬀerence
Loans Preferred Stock between Means
Mean 0.31 0.29 1.32
Standard deviation 0.08 0.10
Source: Mason (1996).Although this evidence indicates that preferred stock purchases were
eﬀective in insulating banks from deposit withdrawal, it is important to
emphasize that the RFC preferred-stock program was successful because
it was neither too conservative nor too liberal with its assistance. The RFC
would have made little diﬀerence if it had targeted only the lowest-risk
banks for its subsidies. As ﬁgure 14.8 and table 14.7 show, that was not the
case. At the same time, the RFC did not provide assistance to deeply in-
solvent banks, nor would its assistance have been a suﬃcient subsidy to
bail out such banks. Moreover, the conditions attached to RFC preferred-
stock purchases served to limit bank risk transference to the RFC, which
ensured that preferred stock issuers had incentives to limit risk. Thus, cap-
ital-impaired (but not deeply insolvent) banks were oﬀered protection
from market discipline essentially on condition that they did not abuse
such protection by transferring too much risk to the government.
How did RFC conditionality ensure this “happy medium” of controlled
risk? First, it oﬀered limited subsidies to banks, and avoided trying to save
“basket cases” (see RFC Circular no. 1, 1932). The RFC required banks to
submit their regulatory examinations for RFC inspection, and banks that
were judged as hopelessly insolvent were rejected. Further evidence of the
selective nature of assistance is provided in table 14.9, which shows that
dividend rates on RFC preferred stock were typically less than 1 percent
below those earned in the marketplace, and were above market rates on
short-term business loans.
In part, the limited subsidy oﬀered by the RFC reﬂected its independent
corporate status. The RFC was a separately capitalized institution—es-
sentially, a government-sponsored enterprise, not a budget line for the ex-
ecutive branch. Table 14.10 reviews the ﬁnancing structure of the RFC
400 Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. Mason
Fig. 14.8 Distribution of condition of banks receiving assistance





Illiquid assets/Total assets –8.220*** –3.564***
(1.566) (1.089)
Bonds, stocks, and securities owned/Illiquid assets 3.225*** 2.568***
(1.252) (1.031)
Real estate owned/Illiquid assets 4.843 3.406
(3.791) (3.415)
Loans and discounts/Illiquid assets 3.975*** 2.811***
(0.983) (0.819)
Paper eligible for rediscount at the Fed/Loans and discounts 1.191** 1.283***
(0.591) (0.513)
Net worth/Total assets 2.040* 1.375
(1.384) (1.225)
Bills payable and rediscounts/Debt –3.722*** –2.750***
(1.378) (1.145)
Interest and discount on loans/Total earnings –1.763** –0.588
(0.904) (0.704)
Recoveries/Total earnings 1.187 –0.222
(1.135) (1.056)
Losses/Total expenses –1.058*** –0.586*
(0.415) (0.366)
Predicted probability of RFC loan –3.663***
(1.483)
Predicted probability of RFC preferred stock purchase 6.873***
(1.276)
No. of individuals in panel 357 327
No. of bank-year observations 979 979
Log-likelihood –990.9 –971.9
Restricted (slopes   0) log-likelihood –1,094.8 –1,094.8
Chi-squared (k – 1 df) 207.9 227.6
Source: Mason (2001a).
Notes: The model measures the determinants of log survival time, measured in days, from 31
December 1931 to 31 December 1935. Both survival models use a Weibull parameterization.
Bank ﬁnancial data are from Federal Reserve Reports of Condition and Income.RFC loan and
preferred stock data are from monthly Reports of Activity of the RFC. The RFC variable in
column (1) pertains to loans, while that in column (2) pertains to preferred stock purchases.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 14.10 Outstanding Publicly Placed Debt Obligations of the RFC (in addition to
those sold to Treasury in Initial Capitalization)
Amount Issued
As of December 1932
Series A $810,000,000.00
Total $810,000,000.00





Series Feb. 1, 1934 78,726,187.37
Series E 101,299,666.67
Total $2,530,025,854.04




































Source: Mason (1996).from its inception through the end of 1937. Its ﬁnancial independence led
its chief executive, Jesse Jones, to see a need to make the RFC proﬁtable on
a cash ﬂow basis, and he proudly proclaimed that it never saw a year of neg-
ative proﬁt under his direction. That constraint, obviously, also limited the
potential size of the subsidy the RFC could oﬀer. For this very limited sub-
sidy to have made a diﬀerence for bank failure risk (as table 14.8 shows it
did), recipients could not have been deeply insolvent.
Second, many restrictions on recipients of RFC assistance ensured that
banks would not take advantage of RFC aid by increasing their default risk.
The RFC was intended to protect banks from a dramatic decline in their
capital, but not to encourage capital-impaired banks from imprudently ex-
panding their portfolio risk. Indeed, the RFC went to great pains to impose
conditions that substituted for depositor discipline on bank risk-taking.
Those conditions included seniority of RFC dividends to all other stock
dividends and voting rights that eﬀectively gave the RFC the ability to di-
rect institutions toward solvency and proﬁtability and limit excessive risk.
In many instances, the RFC used its control rights to replace bank oﬃcers
and signiﬁcantly alter business practices (Upham and Lamke 1934, 234;
Cho 1953, 29–34; Commercial and Financial Chronicle 1933, 1625–26).
The RFC preserved its seniority of claim on bank earnings by limiting
common stock dividend payments. Common stock dividends were strictly
limited to a speciﬁed maximum and remaining earnings were devoted to a
preferred stock retirement fund. Some ﬁrms avoided applying for RFC
preferred-stock purchases out of reluctance to submit themselves to RFC
authority.
Finally, although there were numerous attempts by politicians to inﬂu-
ence RFC decisions, Mason (2001b, 2003) suggests that the budgetary
structure of the RFC and its decentralized process of decision making in-
sulated the RFC from political manipulation. Field oﬃces were given a
large degree of autonomy over valuation of collateral and other judgmen-
tal decisions, but were held accountable to the central oﬃce for having
made errors that impacted RFC earnings (Delaney 1954, 47–48). Mason
(1996, 2003) shows that objective characteristics of recipients, including
their ﬁnancial condition, their economic importance within their regions,
and other reasonable economic criteria, inﬂuenced the RFC’s choice of re-
cipients; purely political variables (e.g., locations connected to prominent
politicians) did not add explanatory power to models explaining the allo-
cation of RFC assistance.
As ﬁgure 14.9 and table 14.11 show, bank dividends fell dramatically
from 1929 to 1934. To what extent was this decline in dividends, and other
measures to limit bank default risk, the result of RFC conditionality?
Tables 14.12and 14.13examine the extent to which the conditions attached
to RFC assistance made a diﬀerence for the risk choices of recipient banks.
Table 14.12 divides banks into those that received RFC preferred-stock
404 Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. MasonFig. 14.9 U.S. national bank common dividend payout ratio (as percentage of
common capital)
Source: Comptroller of the Currency (various issues).
Table 14.11 Dividends of U.S. National Banks
Common Preferred Common Dividends/
Dividends Dividends Common Capital
June 1929 116,254 n.a. 7.14
December 1929 131,643 n.a. 7.72
June 1930 105,386 n.a. 6.04
December 1930 110,091 n.a. 6.44
June 1931 100,400 n.a. 5.95
December 1931 93,623 n.a. 5.77
June 1932 75,532 n.a. 4.81
December 1932 59,849 n.a. 3.66
June 1933 39,247 n.a. 2.68
December 1933 32,391 536 2.24
June 1934 40,027 2,894 3.02
December 1934 42,095 7,209 3.22
June 1935 45,146 8,967 3.90
December 1935 53,640 9,895 4.27
June 1936 51,574 10,570 4.11
December 1936 66,337 7,629 5.22
June 1937 72,642 6,867 5.64
December 1937 64,161 4,665 4.94
Source: Comptroller of the Currency (various issues).
Note: n.a.   not applicable.Table 14.12 Univariate Attributes of Banks with and without RFC Preferred Stock,
Illinois Sample
N Mean SD Min. Max.
Banks without Preferred Stock, 31 December 1934
Dividend payout rate, 1934 161 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.080
Change in dividend payout rate, 1931–1934 161 –0.486 5.477 –11.408 11.002
Change in capital/asset ratio
1929–1934 91 –0.242 0.336 –1.743 0.504
1931–1934 91 –0.345 0.313 –1.701 0.524
1933–1934 146 –0.262 0.180 –0.895 0.104
Asset growth
1929–1934 91 0.044 0.408 –0.713 1.589
1929–1931 91 0.194 0.336 –0.497 1.725
1929–1933 146 0.270 0.166 –0.116 0.951
Estimated P (fail)
1929 69 0.138 0.145 0.000 0.662
1931 88 0.096 0.129 0.000 0.696
1933 144 0.021 0.064 0.000 0.543
1934 158 0.004 0.014 0.000 0.110
Change in estimated P (fail)
1929–1934 68 –6.640 4.222 –18.602 4.721
1931–1934 86 –5.761 4.012 –16.027 5.233
1933–1934 142 –3.166 5.026 –32.353 9.242
Banks with Preferred Stock, 31 December 1934
Dividend payout rate, 1934 75 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.050
Change in dividend payout rate, 1931–1934 75 –4.000 5.951 –11.408 10.820
Change in capital/asset ratio
1929–1934 56 –0.201 0.405 –1.873 0.744
1931–1934 58 –0.317 0.339 –2.049 0.315
1933–1934 63 –0.210 0.266 –1.479 0.338
Asset growth
1929–1934 56 –0.090 0.349 –0.703 1.078
1929–1931 58 0.098 0.293 –0.374 1.436
1929–1933 63 0.205 0.187 –0.220 1.042
Estimated P (fail)
1929 44 0.165 0.124 0.001 0.656
1931 58 0.147 0.136 0.000 0.536
1933 63 0.056 0.103 0.000 0.420
1934 75 0.011 0.042 0.000 0.342
Change in estimated P (fail)
1929–1934 44 –7.521 5.311 –21.626 0.995
1931–1934 58 –6.526 5.342 –19.975 5.027
1933–1934 63 –4.388 4.998 –19.024 12.349
Note: N   number of observations; SD   standard deviation; Min.   minimum; Max.  
maximum.assistance between March 1933 and December 1934 and those that did
not. Most of this assistance was provided in late 1933. Table 14.12 com-
pares mean bank characteristics of recipients and nonrecipients prior to,
and subsequent to, preferred stock purchases. Clearly, preferred stock re-
cipients (with average failure probabilities of 0.056) were much more at
riskof failure as of 1933 than nonrecipients (with average failure probabil-
ities of 0.021). Recipients’ probabilities of failure fell faster than those of
nonrecipients from 1933 to 1934, and that relative decline in risk reﬂected
much greater reductions in dividend payout, much greater contraction of
total assets in 1934, and a lesser decline in capital-to-asset ratios.
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Table 14.13 Two-Stage Model of the Eﬀects of Preferred Stock on Bank Choices of Capital
Ratios and Dividend Payouts
Dependent Variable RFC Preferred Stock
A. First-Round RFC Preferred stock regression
Intercept –9,657,421
(1,809,977)
Size (log of total assets) 633,609
(114,548)
Illiquid assets (loans and  1,279,659




No. of observations 144
R2 0.1809
Adjusted R2 0.1635
Dividends/ Net Change in Change in
Total Worth/ Dividends/ Net Worth/
Common Total Total Common Total
Capital Assets Capital Assets
B. Second-Round Regression of Predicted RFC Preferred 
Stock and Fundamentals on Capital and Dividends
Intercept 0.0068 0.1373 –0.0160 –0.0670
(0.0019) (0.0066) (0.0029) (0.0072)
P(Fail)31 –0.0085 0.0029 0.0172 0.0984
(0.0102) (0.0363) (0.0161) (0.0398)
Predicted preferred  1.850E-09 –2.010E-08 –1.244E-08 1.169E-08
stock sold to RFC (1.540E-09) (5.484E-09) (2.432E-09) (6.012E-09)
No. of observations 144 144 144 144
R2 0.0155 0.0869 0.1643 0.0624
Adjusted R2 0.0016 0.074 0.1525 0.0492
Notes: Amounts are coeﬃcients; standard errors are in parentheses.Table 14.13 examines the role of preferred stock conditionality on bank
choice of capital ratios and dividend payout more formally. Panel A is a
ﬁrst-stage regression predicting preferred stock assistance. Panel B is the
second-stage regression analyzing the eﬀect of preferred stock assistance
on banks’ choices of dividends and capital ratios (using a Heckman cor-
rection to control for the endogeneity of the preferred stock assistance).
The last two columns of panel B show that receiving preferred stock as-
sistance signiﬁcantly increases banks’ capital ratios and reduces their
dividend payout. These results conﬁrm that banks that received preferred
stock assistance were eﬀectively constrained in the extent to which their
stockholders could transfer risk to the RFC.
RFC preferred-stock assistance was a way to help banks smooth the ad-
justment process toward low default risk. It insulated banks from the threat
of sudden deposit withdrawal by reducing deposit default risk, but substi-
tuted RFC discipline for market discipline to ensure that banks adopted
prudent long-run risk management and capital accumulation policies.
14.3 Recent Japanese Experience
The Japanese banking collapse of the 1990s occurred in a very diﬀerent
institutional context from that of the U.S. banking collapse of the Great
Depression. The existence of implicit deposit insurance protection (which
was made explicit in the 1990s) meant that Japanese bank depositors were
little concerned about the potential loss of deposits placed in Japanese
banks, and therefore had scant incentive to exercise discipline on banks.
Additionally, Japanese banks have much closer relationships with aﬃli-
ated ﬁrms than American banks have had traditionally, and Japanese
banks own substantial equity positions in those ﬁrms. That complicates
the valuation of Japanese bank loan holdings, since banks may have spe-
cial obligations or incentives to absorb loan losses in ways that are not
transparent from an examination of balance sheet data. For example,
Sheard (1989) argues that main banks provide implicit insurance to other
creditors that participate in loans to their client ﬁrms. And there have been
some recent claims that equity investments in Japanese banks by client
ﬁrms may represent “ﬁctitious capital” in the sense that bank borrowers
may be encouraged to buy capital in exchange for continuing credit access
(which amounts to banks’ lending money for the purpose of ﬁnancing the
purchase of bank stock).
Furthermore, reﬂecting the absence of market pressures on banks to
provide informative signals to private debtholders, Japanese accounting
practices today are quite diﬀerent from American banks’ accounting prac-
tices in the 1930s, and much less informative of actual bank condition. For
all these reasons, the value of Japanese bank investments (loans, stocks,
and other assets) reported on balance sheets provides a poorer indication
of true value than do American bank accounts of the 1930s.
408 Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. MasonIndeed, the broad range of recent estimates of the amount of bad Japan-
ese bank loans and the likely recovery rates on those loans illustrate how
diﬃcult it is to glean reality from reported statistics. As of the end of May
2001, the oﬃcial estimate of outstanding ﬁnancial-sector nonperforming
loans was ¥34,000 billion, but Goldman Sachs calculated at that time that
in the “worst-case scenario” nonperforming loans could be as high as
¥63,000 billion. Bank insolvency and the extent of negative bank net worth
in the United States during the 1930s were relatively easy to observe be-
cause market discipline forced insolvent banks to fail. In Japan, however,
“zombie” banks (to use the expression coined by Ed Kane) can continue
almost indeﬁnitely, and it is very hard to measure their insolvency.
Another important diﬀerence between the U.S. Depression experience
and the current Japanese context is the duration of bank distress, the seem-
ingly endless waves of increasing bank loan losses that plague Japanese
banks. By most accounts, Japanese banks have been inadequately capital-
ized for a decade, and many have been insolvent for more than ﬁve years.
Japanese bank loan write-downs totaled ¥10 trillion a year in both 1997
and 1998, when Japanese banks began to write down loan losses in earnest.
In 1999, two of the most informed authorities on Japanese bank accounts
and solvency, Takeo Hoshi and Hugh Patrick (2000, 20), thought that
Japanese banks had turned a corner: “Late 1998 and early 1999 was a sig-
niﬁcant turning point. The ‘crisis’ in the banking system is ﬁnally over,
though most banks still have substantial restructuring problems. Japan is
now in the process of building a new ﬁnancial system.” Yet loan write-downs
in 1999 and 2000 were roughly ¥4.5 trillion in each year. And despite these
formidable write-downs, Japanese bank losses have continued to grow, as
new nonperforming loans replace those that were previously written down.
This continuing growth in nonperforming loans reﬂects new deteriora-
tion in asset values and deﬂationary monetary policy, as well as previously
unrecognized earlier losses. After a decade of ﬂat growth and shrinking as-
set prices, Japan is now seen by many observers as poised at the precipice
of economic collapse. Japan, like the United States in the early 1930s, has
been caught in a deﬂationary trap, albeit a much longer-lived one. De-
flation weakens ﬁrms’ and banks’ balance sheets, producing further weak-
ening of aggregate demand, and further deﬂation (Irving Fisher’s debt-
deﬂation cycle).
The combination of government protection and a deﬂationary environ-
ment also aﬀects bank strategies toward loan liquidation. In the current
environment, the backlog of unresolved loans and weak corporate and
bank balance sheets have created a massive liquidity premium in asset pric-
ing. Ten-year bonds yield under 1 percent while stock prices and real estate
prices continue to slip. Banks, particularly in a regime of government de-
posit insurance, have little incentive to hurry to liquidate the assets of their
distressed borrowers, especially since banks are shareholders in many of
these ﬁrms. Making matters worse is the historical absence of bankruptcy
How to Restructure Failed Banking Systems: United States and Japan 409or liquidation procedures, which makes orderly liquidation even more
challenging. Thus the backlog continues alongside continuing deﬂation
and deepening loan losses.
Banks have received substantial assistance from the government. In ad-
dition to anemic early programs to purchase bad loans from banks—an
initiative that so far has not produced much incentive for rational disposal
of bad loans (see Packer 2000)—the government has oﬀered ﬁnancial as-
sistance to banks twice, in March 1998 and March 1999. Table 14.14 sum-
marizes the amounts and types of assistance, and the terms and conditions
of that assistance. Like the RFC, the Japanese government began to oﬀer
assistance primarily in the form of loans and debt purchases, and subse-
quently came to rely almost exclusively on preferred stock purchases (see
also Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 2000).
The new prime minister, Mr. Koizumi, promises painful structural re-
form of government expenditure policy, and talks of the need to accelerate
bank loan write-downs, which he says are the keys to rebuilding the Japan-
ese economy. Some speculate that more preferred stock assistance will be
forthcoming to help spur debt write-downs. But nowhere in sight (given
the current Bank of Japan leadership) is there a credible commitment to
ending deﬂationary monetary policy. Without that change, bank balance
sheets will continue to deteriorate and banks will continue to postpone
liquidation in the hope that they can proﬁt from future improvements
in macroeconomic circumstances (the “real option” incentive problem de-
scribed in Mason 2002).
14.3.1 Regulatory Discipline: a Substitute for Market Discipline?
Figures 14.10 through 14.11 provide a picture of bank capital and lend-
ing behavior that diﬀers greatly from the patterns shown in ﬁgures 14.3 and
14.4. The diﬀerences between Japanese lending behavior and that of the
United States in the 1930s is even greater when one takes into account the
understatement of Japanese capital losses during the early and mid-1990s.
Japanese bank-lending ratios grew substantially from 1995 to 1997 as
Japanese bank capital ratios plummeted. The mid-1990s saw substantial
increases in Japanese lending elsewhere in Asia, which some observers
have characterized as a search for ways to increase loan risk in order to take
full advantage of the implicit put option value of government protection.
After 1997, bank losses were too large and too visible to continue the mas-
querade of denial, and international and domestic pressures came to bear
on the Japanese government to recognize loan losses and to restrict bank
lending accordingly.
Figure 14.12 tells a somewhat similar story through the window of the
bank market-to-book value of equity ratio, weighted by bank asset size.
The expansion of asset risk in 1996 boosted the market value of bank cap-
ital (which incorporates the value of the implicit put option). Since 1997,
410 Charles W. Calomiris and Joseph R. MasonTable 14.14 Approved Conditions for Public Funds Injection into Japanese Banks
Convertible Period until Dividend Subordinated
Total Preferred Conversion Can Yield Bonds or
Amount Stock Be Done (Years) (%) Loans
A. March 1999
Daiwa 408 408 0.25 1.06 0
Chao Trust 150 150 0.25 0.90 0
Mitsui Trust 400.2 250.2 0.25 1.25 150
Sakura 800 800 3.50 1.33 0
Fuji 1,000 250 5.50 0.40 200
250 7.50 0.55
300 (nonconvertible) 2.10
Sumitomo Trust 200 100 2.00 0.76 100
Mitsubishi Trust 300 200 4.33 0.81 100
Toyo Trust 200 200 0.25 1.15 0
Bank of Yokohama 200 70 2.33 1.13 100
30 5.33 1.89
Asahi 500 300 3.25 1.15 100
100 4.25 1.48
Tokai 600 300 3.25 0.93 0
300 4.25 0.97
Sumitomo 501 201 3.08 0.35 0
300 6.33 0.95
DKB 900 200 5.33 0.41 200
200 6.33 0.70
300 (nonconvertible) 2.38
IBJ 600 175 4.25 0.43 250
175 4.42 1.40
Sanwa 700 600 2.25 0.53 100
Total 7,459 6,159 1,300
Amount
Type of Issuance (Billion Yen)
B. March 1998
Nippon Credit Bank Preferred stock 60
Ashikaga Bank Perpetual subordinated bonds 30
Daiwa Perpetual subordinated loans 100
Yasuda Trust Perpetual subordinated bonds 150
LTCB 1 Perpetual subordinated loans 46.6
LTCB 2 Preferred stock 130
Chuo Trust 1 Perpetual subordinated loans 28
Chuo Trust 2 Preferred stock 32
Hokuriku Bank Perpetual subordinated loans 20
Mitsui Trust Perpetual subordinated bonds 100
Sakura Perpetual subordinated bonds 100
Fuji Perpetual subordinated bonds 100
Sumitomo Trust Perpetual subordinated bonds 100
Mitsubishi Trust Perpetual subordinated bonds 50
Toyo Trust Perpetual subordinated bonds 50
(continued)the combination of loan losses and restrictions on bank lending have
caused the ratio of the market-to-book value of equity to plummet.
That is not to say that banks have been eﬀectively constrained by regu-
lators in their pursuit of increased asset risk. Nobu Hibara (2001) ﬁnds that
regulatory capital standards have eﬀectively linked bank loans to the total
amount of book capital. Nevertheless, banks in the weakest condition (for
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Table 14.14 (continued)
Amount
Type of Issuance (Billion Yen)
Bank of Yokohama Perpetual subordinated loans 20
Asahi Perpetual subordinated loans 100
Tokai Perpetual subordinated loans 100
Sumitomo Perpetual subordinated bonds 100
Bank of Tokyo–Mitsubishi Perpetual subordinated bonds 100
DKB Preferred stock 99
IBJ Subordinated bonds (ﬁxed periods) 100
Sanwa Subordinated bonds (ﬁxed periods) 100
Total 1,726
Source: Nikkei Shinbun (13, 18 March 1998, and 5, 13 March 1999)
Fig. 14.10 Capital and loans of Japanese banks, 1993–2000
Source: Japanese Bankers Association.Fig. 14.11 Capital-to-asset and loan-to-asset ratios of Japanese banks, 
1993–2000
Source: Japanese Bankers Association.
Fig. 14.12 Market-to-book ratios of Japanese banks, 1993–2000
Source: Japanese Bankers Association.whom the put option of government protection is most valuable) gravitate
toward the lowest-quality loans, and boost asset risk by increasing the risk-
iness of their loan portfolios.
To what extent has government assistance in March 1998 and March
1999 been targeted to banks with the best franchises, and to what extent
has it been linked to eﬀective conditionality that limits banks’ ability to
transfer risk to the government? The evidence in table 14.14 indicates that
the Japanese government did not try to target assistance selectively. Virtu-
ally every bank of any signiﬁcant size received preferred stock assistance.
If anything, it appears that the weakest Japanese banks (Nippon Credit
and Long-Term Credit Bank [LTCB]) were the earliest (1998) recipients of
preferred stock purchases. Due to the small sample of banks and the un-
certain quality of the balance sheet data, we were not able to perform a sat-
isfactory analysis of the diﬀerences in condition between banks that re-
ceived preferred stock assistance and those that did not.
Table 14.15and ﬁgure 14.13plot dividend payments by banks from 1993
to 2001. Interestingly, dividend payments fell dramatically in 1999, but
then more than rebounded. Thus, as Japanese banks continued to experi-
ence rising loan losses and declines in equity capital, they kept sending
much of the cash inﬂow that they received from the government in 1998
and 1999 to their shareholders. Clearly, this is at odds with the purpose of
a preferred stock purchase program.
14.4 Policy Implications
The essential point of our comparison of U.S. banks in the 1930s and
Japanese banks in the 1990s is that, in the historical case, assistance to
banks occurred within a context of market discipline, and the conditions
attached to government assistance helped to strengthen market discipline.
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Table 14.15 Japanese Bank Dividend Payments for Stable Sample of Banks,
1993–2001










Source: Japanese Bankers Association.
Note: n.a.   not available.In the current Japanese case, in contrast, assistance was oﬀered within the
context of an absence of market discipline, and there is little evidence that
conditions attached to assistance have encouraged banks to move toward
eﬀective long-run risk management. That failure reﬂects in part the relative
extremity of Japanese bank distress, and in part, the lack of incentives of
Japanese banks to limit the transference of risk to the government.
Is it possible, in the current protected environment, for government to
ﬁnd a way of providing a credible combination of ﬁnancial assistance to
banks and conditionality that limits the abuse of that assistance? We think
it is possible to apply the lessons of the RFC to contemporary assistance
programs.
Doing so requires the adoption of three related and mutually reinforcing
means of limiting bank abuse of protection: (1) designing programs of as-
sistance that are selective, and are thus able to target ﬁnancial assistance to
banks that are worth preserving; (2) specifying clear, quantiﬁable rules that
limit access to preferred stock assistance and that tie assistance to eﬀective
risk management by recipient banks; and (3) enacting new, ongoing capi-
tal regulation that establishes meaningful standards for risk-based capital.
With respect to selectivity, Calomiris (1998, 1999) suggests using a com-
mon stock issuance matching requirement to encourage the best banks to
“self-select” to participate in subsidized preferred-stock purchases. That
approach would attract capital-impaired but relatively healthy banks with
high franchise values, but discourage deeply insolvent banks from apply-
ing for government subsidies. Those banks’ stockholders would be unable
to qualify for subsidized preferred-stock purchases because they would be
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Fig. 14.13 Japanese bank dividend payments for stable sample of banks, 1993–2001
Source: Japanese Bankers Association.unable to ﬁnd willing purchasers of new matching common-stock oﬀer-
ings. The beauty of this self-selection mechanism is that it brings market
judgments to bear on the allocation of scarce government funds. It does
not require the government to pick and choose; the same preferred stock
purchase program would be available to all banks, but not all would be able
to participate.
Limits on common stock dividend payments, among other conditions
attached to preferred stock purchases, are an obvious way to encourage
banks to use the new lease on life granted by government protection to re-
build their capital, rather than to engage in strategies that maximize the op-
tion value of deposit insurance.
Emergency assistance to banks should be linked to a phasing in of cred-
ible capital regulation. Eﬀective risk-based capital regulation would pro-
tect taxpayers’ investments in bank preferred stock and limit taxpayer lia-
bility for insured deposits in rescued banks. It would also restore eﬀective
discipline on bank risk management in the future by eliminating incentives
for risk arbitrage.
Eﬀective capital regulation must provide a credible and ﬂexible means to
measure the riskiness of bank positions and the adequacy of bank capital.
Thus, bank capital regulation must focus on ways to incorporate market
signals about underlying bank risk into the regulatory process. Calomiris
(1997, 1999) and Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000) have ar-
gued that a subordinated debt requirement (which can be structured to
take account of the particular types of debt instruments that are available
in each country) is an essential part of an eﬀective capital requirement (see
also Calomiris and Powell 2001). A minimum ratio of subordinated debt
relative to bank assets would ensure that, on the margin, someone bears the
default risk of bank debt. That would make banks care about limiting their
default risk in order to maintain the requisite outstanding issues of subor-
dinated debt. Furthermore, the observed market yield on subordinated
debt would be of great value to regulators for measuring and enforcing
capital adequacy standards. A visible public signal of bank health would
provide supervisors with new information. Even more important, by mak-
ing bank weakness publicly observable, it would promote greater account-
ability of supervisors and regulators and undermine the destructive phe-
nomenon of regulatory “forbearance.”
Of course, eﬀective bank regulatory policy by itself cannot make a
healthy banking system (see Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 1997). Stable
monetary and ﬁscal policy are necessary preconditions for healthy banks.
In some countries, a lack of ﬁscal discipline makes banks prey to attacks
on currency pegs. In other cases, including the United States in the early
1930s and Japan today, banking system recovery is dependent on bringing
deﬂationary monetary policy to an end.
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Comment Simon Johnson
This is a thought-provoking paper that should be read carefully by anyone
thinking about either banking crises or—topical for the United States to-
day—the causes and eﬀects of collapses in any highly leveraged ﬁrm (such
as Enron). If anything, the implications of this paper are considerably
wider than even the authors realize.
The main focus of the paper is on the canonical case of systemic bank
failure: the United States in the 1930s. This rightly remains the benchmark
for all models of where collapses come from and how they spread. The au-
thors draw on their important recent papers on this subject and summarize
the key ﬁndings clearly. At the same time, they extend these ideas to the fas-
cinating case of Japan since the late 1980s.
The authors’ argument falls into two parts. First, they argue that there
were fewer crises before the advent of bank regulation. In large part this
was probably due to better monitoring by the “market,” in particular by
large depositors who had both a real interest in watching banks carefully
and the ability to trigger moves by other, smaller depositors. Particularly
intriguing is the idea that banking assistance in the United States during
the 1930s had a much greater component of “market discipline” than has
been the case in Japan recently.
Second, the authors extend this reasoning to think clearly about the
right way to run bank bailouts. In their scheme, the government would buy
preferred stock but only if the “market” buys matching common stock.
Again, the emphasis is on engaging the private sector in eﬀective monitor-
ing. Their other proposals, such as requiring a minimum ratio of subordi-
nated debt relative to bank assets, are along similar lines.
The evidence in favor of these ideas is strong. For the United States in
the 1930s, the authors are fully persuasive. Real shocks hit ﬁrms, then
spread to banks and created small panics. The problems were exacerbated
by deﬂationary monetary policies, helping to trigger larger bank failures
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were able to develop policies that complemented pressure from the market
in forcing banks to improve their performance.
Japan in the 1990s experienced similar problems but developed much
less eﬀective solutions. An initial asset price stock had a negative impact on
ﬁrms and banks. Again, the eﬀects were worsened by a deﬂationary mon-
etary policy, pushing the economy into a long-term recession. In this case,
however, the regulator has repeatedly provided additional capital to banks
without suﬃcient pressure to change performance (or the involvement of
any real market forces).
These ideas are relevant to a range of issues around the world today. In
particular, the authors highlight the importance of combining market pres-
sure and strong “institutions”—that is, the public regulations that govern
private economic relationships. In their scheme, the market needs to know
what is really going on at banks. There must be some form of eﬀective se-
curities regulation, forcing the disclosure of information. There must also
be suﬃciently strong corporate law, in order for shareholders to exercise
their rights. There surely also needs to be a judiciary that can enforce con-
tracts. What is the precise combination of institutions necessary, at a min-
imum, to make market-based restructuring feasible? This is an important
issue for further theoretical and empirical work.
Looking at the issues from the other side, what if there is no real regula-
tor or no enforceable regulation? To what extent can the market solve or
prevent banking problems completely by itself? For example, in countries
such as Russia, Turkey, and Mexico, there has been a real struggle during
the 1990s to establish eﬀective securities and banking regulation. Recent
Korean experience deﬁnitely indicates that “market-based” solutions re-
quire strong institutions.
Thinking just about variation within the United States, it seems clear
that market pressures are quite eﬀective at controlling the banking system
and handling bank-speciﬁc diﬃculties as they arise. The market is much
less eﬀective at dealing with highly leveraged nonbanks, such as long-term
capital management (LTCM) and Enron. At least in part, this diﬀerence
must be due to the fact that the disclosure of information and accounting
standards are much tougher (in the sense of really being enforced) for
banks than for nonbank ﬁrms with large-scale investments in derivatives.
In fact, there appears to be a dangerous loophole in current U.S. regula-
tions—pure banks and traditional ﬁrms (publicly listed) are well regulated
and watched eﬀectively by the market. But hybrid bank-ﬁrms can accu-
mulate large levels of leverage, avoid eﬀective regulation, and play the mar-
ket against itself in ways that prevent eﬀective supervision of any kind.
Clearly agency problems inside accounting ﬁrms and large investment
banks play an important role, although we need more research to under-
stand precisely how.
How to Restructure Failed Banking Systems: United States and Japan 421More generally, how should we think of the Calomiris and Mason line of
research? Is it just about banks or are they addressing much bigger issues
about the organization of capitalism? In my view, this work should be seen
as central to the rapidly developing literature on the real eﬀects of institu-
tions.
Institutions appear to matter for long-term economic development. For
example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) show that the way in
which countries were colonized has had persistent eﬀects on their income
per capita over the very long run. Recent work by La Porta et al. (1997,
1998, 1999) has also established that law matters for the level of investor
protection, for ﬁnancial development, and for the quality of governmental
institutions. A large ﬁnance literature extends and tests these ideas.
The rules governing ﬁnancial arrangements may also matter for short-
run macroeconomic outcomes. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that in
large part the Asian ﬁnancial crisis was due to the combination of free cap-
ital ﬂows and weak institutions. More generally, Blanchard (2000) suggests
that economies with diﬀerent institutions may experience diﬀerent short-
run macroeconomic patterns, such as more or less severe crises in response
to similar shocks (see also Rodrik 1999). In addition, institutions that were
once eﬀective in supporting productive activities may decline in relevance
or even become a problem, as Olson (1982) argued. Evidence in favor of
Olson’s idea is growing—see, for example, Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung
(2000) and Johnson and Mitton (2003).
Calomiris and Mason’s research conﬁrms that ﬁnancial regulation
should be regarded as a central piece of any country’s institutions. Their
main contribution, in my view, is to emphasize that market-based moni-
toring can be eﬀective only if combined with eﬀective regulation. Con-
versely, eﬀective regulation may work only to the extent that it is combined
with and builds on what powerful market participants can do and want to
do. This ﬁts well with recent evidence from Eastern Europe (see Glaeser,
Johnson, and Shleifer 2001).
The research question before us now is precisely how to integrate these
literatures. How much regulation is enough for a country like the United
States or like Russia? What exactly are the links between institutions in
general, corporate governance in particular, and macroeconomic dynam-
ics? In countries with weak institutions, how should the development of ﬁ-
nancial markets best be integrated with the development of ﬁnancial regu-
lation?
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